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Corroboration of Confessions in a Criminal Case
in Virginia
JAAlxs W.

PAYNE, JIL

The purpose of this brief note is to examine the Virginia
rules relating to the requirement of corroboration of an extrajudicial, confession as a basis for conviction of a criminal offense. The rules discussed herein do not, of course, apply to a
plea of guilty in open court, and it might be noted too that the
title selected by the author may be misleading in that, as a
general rule, the rules discussed do apply to incriminating
admissions of fact (except those occurring before the alleged
criminal act) as well as full confessions. Armot., 45 A. L. R. 2d
1316, 1323 (1956). "A confession is the admission of guilt by
the defendant of all the necessary elements of the crime of
which he is charged, including the necessary acts and intent.
An admission merely admits some fact which connects or
tends to connect the defendant with the offense but not with
all the elements of the crime." State v. Masato Karumai, 101
Utah 592, 126 P. 2d 1047 (1942). It has also been held that
where the admission is revelant merely by virtue of its utterance, without regard to its veracity, the corroboration requirement does not apply. E.g. People v. Fratiano, 132 Cal.
App. 2d 610, 282 P. 2d 1002 (1955) where the statement
amounted to an overt act in a criminal conspiracy. There, of
course, the problem of trustworthiness, which is at the heart
of the corroboration requirement, does not exist and the de(ision seems sound.
1.

The Rule and the Policy Behind It.

Although no exhaustive review of all of the Virginia cases
will be attempted here, the Virginia court has long adhered
to the proposition that the corpus delicti cannot be proved
solely by extra-judicial confessions or admissions. E.g.: Plynmle v. Commonwealth, 195 Va. 582 (1954); Campbell v. Corn-
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monwealth, 194 Va. 925 (1953); Pepoon v.'Commonwealth,
192 Va. 804 (1951); Wheeler v. Commonwealth, 192 Va. 665
(1951); Newberry v. Commonwealth, 191 Va. 445 (1950);
Cleek v. Commonwealth, 165 Va. 697 (1935) ; Hamiltonv. Commonwealth, 163 Va. 1089 (1935) ; Moore v. Commonwealth, 132
Va. 741 (1922) ; Collins v. Commonwealth, 123 Va. 815 (1918) ;
Cochran v. Commonwealth, 122 Va. 801 (1917) ; Brown v. Comionwealth, 89 Va. 379 (1892).
What is the policy behind such a rule? Something of the
reasoning involved is suggested in 4 Blackstone, Commentaries, 357 (18th London Ed. 1838), where the author says of
confessions:
[T] hey are the weakest and most suspicious of all testimony; ever liable to be obtained by artifice, false hopes,
promises of favor or menaces; seldom rendered accurately or repeated with due precision; and incapable
in their nature of being disproved by negative evidence.
I Greenleaf on Evidence §217 (15th ed. 1892) states
In the United States, the prisoner's confession, when
the corpus delicti is not otherwise proved, has been held
insufficient for his conviction; and this opinion certainly
best accords with the humanity of the criminal code, and
with the great degree of caution applied in receiving and
weighing the evidence of confessions in other cases, and
it seems countenanced by approved writers on this branch
of the law.
In 3 Wigmore, Evidence, §865 (3d ed. 1940), the learned
author comments on the extreme caution evidenced by judicial
decisions relating to the admissibility in evidence of the extrajudicial confession generally. His comment is directed toward
the rule under consideration as well as toward other safeguards surrounding the introduction of such a confession in
evidence. Professor Wigmore advances a series of reasons for
the development of these precautions described by him "as a
weak sentimentalism toward criminals." The first historical
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reason advanced by the author is "the character of person
usually brought before judges on charges of crime." Such persons, presumably, were largely made up of members of the
peasant class who might easily be influenced to confess falsely,
by their "landed superiors" who controlled the fortunes of
their social and economic subordinates. The second reason suggested was the absence in the early common law of any right
of appeal in criminal cases and "the practical creation of the
law of confessions by isolated judges at Nisi Pruis without
consultation and on independent responsibility," resulting in
a tendency to exclude all questionable evidence. The third and
perhaps most persuasive reason advanced was the inability at
common law of the accused to testify in his own behalf or to
have counsel defend him. Professor Wigmore suggests that
since these conditions no longer prevail today, the extreme
caution existing with regard to the receipt of confessions in
evidence should be abandoned.
More specifically, in discussing the corroboration requirement, Wigmore suggests:
The policy of any rule of the sort is questionable. No
one doubts that the warning which it conveys is a proper
one; but it is a warning which can be given with equal
efficacy by counsel or (in a jurisdiction preserving the
orthodox function of judges) by the judge in his charge
on the facts. Common intelligence and caution, in the
jurors' minds, will sufficiently appreciate it, without a
laying on of the road in the shape of a rule of law. Moreover, the danger which it is supposed to guard against is
greatly exaggerated in common thought. That danger
lies wholly in a false confession of guilty. Such confessions, however, so far as handed down to us in the annals
of our courts, have been exceedingly rare.... Such a rule
might ordinarily, if not really needed, at least be merely
superfluous. But this rule, and all such rules, are today
constantly resorted to by unscrupulous counsel as mere
verbal formulas with which to entrap the trial judge into
an error of words in his charge to the jury. These capabilities of abuse make it often a positive obstruction to the
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course of justice. 3 Wigmore, Evidence §2070 (3d ed.
1940).
Wigmore's reasoning here is less than convincing insofar
as he bases his rejection of the corroboration requirement on
the small number of false confessions of guilt. The only evidence of this fact resorted to in the section quoted is the
paucity of reports of such cases in court annals. The cogency
of this evidence, though, depends on the doubtful assumption
that most, or at least a substantial number, of such cases
would crop up in such annals. The courts have reasoned differently. For example, in the leading case of Forte v. United
States, 68 App. D. C. 111, 94 F. (2d) 236, (1937) the court
states:
[T]he conclusions reached by Mr. Wigmore on the one
hand, and by Mr. Greenleaf and the greater number of
the courts in the United States on the other, differ because
they proceed from contrary premises. Mr. Wigmore's
premise is that there is little danger of false confessions
of guilt. He predicates this upon the proposition above
quoted that 'so far as handed down to us in the annals
of our courts, [false confessions] have been exceedingly
rare." To support this statement he comments that 'no
trustworthy figures of authenticated instances of [false
confessions] exist; but they are concededly few.' 2 Wigmore, Evidence (2d Ed. 1923) §867, pp. 227-228. He then
reviews in footnote a number of 'most notable in English
and American annals' including Perry's Case, 14 How.
St. Tr. 1312, 1660-where one of two brothers confessed
that he, his brother and his mother had murdered his
master, and they were executed, and two years after the
master returned home explaining that he had been kidnapped and sold to the Turks. The premise of the reasoning of Mr. Greenleaf and the great majority of the
courts in the United States is that there is real danger
of false confessions, coerced or psychopathic. For this
premise there seems now, whatever may have been the
state of the dati in 1923, the'date of Mr. Wigmore's work,
substantial foundation, not only in the annals of the
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courts in the sense of the reported decisions thereof, but
also in dependable reports in criminological investigations.
Similar suggestions were advanced in State v. Johnson, 95
Utah 572, 83 P. 2d 1010 (1938). There the court states:
[E]xperience has shown that confessions sometimes
turn out unfounded; that persons for the thrill or for
publicity, or from mental derangement often confess the
commission of crimes never committed, or which investigation shows they did not commit, as illustrated by persons posing as kidnappers in an effort to collect the ransom money. The weak, to avoid apparent impending peril
and under the force of surroundings, or imaginary dangers, have been induced to state untruths. So too one
often confesses or claims the commission of a crime he
did not commit to avoid investigation into his own, or
some other person's activities or history, or to avoid the
prosecution of some one on another charge.
Confessions are necessarily weak or strong evidence
according to the circumstances attending the making and
proving of them; and we think the only safe general rule
is to require some other evidence corroborative of their
truth.
The reasons advanced in Fortev. United States and in State
v. Johnson appeal to this writer as a sufficient basis for the
retention of the rule requiring corroboration of the confdssions of the accused in a criminal case. The tendency to surround the defendant in a criminal trial with every rational
protective principle results from some fundamental notion of
fairness that views with abhorrence the possible conviction
and punishment of an innocent man. It is submitted that there
is a very real danger of false confessions of guilt in criminal
cases whether arising from duress, psychological disability, or
mistake; and even the possibility that these instances may be
rare in number does not appeal as an adequate reason for
abandoning a principle specifically designed to protect those
few individuals noted above who may need its protection.
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It is, however, certainly arguable that the dangers of a false
statement arising from mental derangement are substantially
lessened in the case of an exculpatory but incriminating admission so that there is less reason for applying the corroboration requirement to such a statement. The Virginia cases
have stated the requirement in language that applies bojh to
a confession and an admission. Hamilton v. Commonwealth,
163 Va. 1089 (1935).
Should the rule be relaxed into a discretionary principlel
Professor McCormick has suggested that any fixed rule requiring corroboration of a confession in a criminal case
would be less "effective" in protecting the innocent than discretion of the appellate court to review the facts. McCormick,
Evidence §110, Note 5 (1954). This suggestion provokes a
number of questions. The first is: "Why?" Professor McCormick, in the section quoted, is explicitly concerned with abandoning an inflexible rule which might create an undue impediment to conviction of the guilty. It seems reasonable to suggest that greater protection is afforded the accused in a jurisdiction retaining the corroboration requirement and, at the
same time, exercising broad powers of review through its
appellate court. The secoad question is whether or not Professor McCormick would retain the corroboration requirement in some fixed form in those jurisdictions where the appellate court cannot reverse a conviction if there is evidence
to support it even though the verdict seems unjust to that
court or not supported by evidence establishing guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt. A third question is put in Morgan, Maguire and Weinstein, Cases on Evidence, 491 (4th ed. 1957):
"Would such power place too great a burden on appellate
courts by requiring a review of the entire record in most
criminal cases?" It does seem reasonable to suggest that, in
those jurisdictions in which the appellate court is allowed narrow scope in reversing a criminal conviction, abandonment of
the corroboration requirement would work a substantial
change in the protection afforded the accused in a criminal
case since the confession alone or the confession accompanied
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by less corroborative evidence than is now required might well
be taken as sufficient evidence to support a conviction. The
change might prove less drastic in a jurisdiction where the
appellate court exercises a sort of free-wheeling discretion
in reversing a criminal conviction on the basis of insufficient
evidence. Even here, however, there might well be a substantial increase in the number of convictions and appeals therefrom which would, as a practical matter, increase the already
heavy burden of the appellate court.
It can be noted, parenthetically, that the Virginia court apparently exercises liberal or broad discretionary powers in
reversing a criminal conviction for lack of sufficient evidence
to support the conviction. 5 Michie's Jurisprudence,Criminal
Procedure§62 (1949) and the many cases cited there. Analytically, it might be urged that a criminal conviction should be
reversed for insufficient evidence only when the appellate
court feels that reasonable men could not find that the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. This test
would preclude the appellate court from functioning as a
second jury in the case and reversing because the court itself
felt that the evidence was insufficient to establish guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt. Yet a perusal of the Virginia decisions on
the point suggests that the court sometimes functions as a
second jury in these cases and Chief Justice Hudgins seemed
to be dissenting for this precise reason in the fairly typical
case of Thomas v. Commonwealth, 187 Va. 265, 273 (1948).
II.

What Is Required via Corroboration?

Concededly the fairness of the rule requiring corroboration
of a confession or admission to establish the corpus delicti will
depend upon the nature and amount of corroborative evidence
required:
(a) What has to be corroborated? Professor McCormick
notes that the doctrine under discussion "might involve some
or all of three elements: first, the -harm or injury embraced in
the particular crime, *such-as the death in a murder charge;
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second, the criminal origin of the harm or injury; and, third,
the criminal participation of the accused himself. Most courts
hold that the requirement embraces the first two elements
only." McCormick, Evidence, §110 (1954). This view is supported in Cleek v. Commonwealth, 165 Va. 697 (1935). There
the accused confessed to the sheriff that illegal whiskey found
on the premises of his father belonged to him (the accused).
The court held that the corpus delicti was established when
the illegal whiskey was found and the confession out of court
of the accused was sufficient to connect him with the crime.
The court stated at pages 698, 699: "While it may be true that
the corpus delicti cannot be established by a confession made
out of court and uncorroborated by other evidence . . . yet,
when the corpus delicti has been established as in this case
such a confession is competent evidence to connect the accused
with the crime." This writer doubts that the Virginia court
has departed from this position. There is, however, one relatively recent decision that might be urged as supporting the
minority rule that corroborative evidence apart from the confession must tend to connect the accused with the crime. In
Henry v. Commonwealth, 195 Va. 281 (1953), the court considered the sufficiency of the evidence to establish -the corpus
delicti and seemed to assume that this concept included the
identity of the accused as the criminal agent. (195 Va. at 282288). Professor McCormick points out that "there have been
expressions by judges in some opinions which might suggest
that even the third element also, namely the connection of the
defendant with the crime, must be shown by evidence apart
from the confession, but there seems to be no substantial
support in the decisions for this view." McCormick, Evidence,
§110, Note 7, (1954). He adds that such a rule "would relegate
the confession, even though satisfactorily proved to have been
voluntarily made, to a minor role indeed." Ibid. Wigmore's
comment is more pungent: "A third view, indeed, too absurd
to be argued with, has occasionally been advanced, at least by
counsel, namely, that the 'corpus delicti' includes the third
element also, i.e., the accused's identity or agency as the
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criminal. By, this view, the term 'corpus delicti' would be
synonymous with the whole of the charge, and the role would
require that the whole be evidenced in all three elements independently of the confession, which would be absurd." 3
Wigmore, Evidence §2317, p. 402 (3d ed. 1940). This writer is
frankly puzzled at the reluctance of courts that embrace the
rule that a confession must be corroborated as to the corpus
delicti-i.e., the commission of the criminal offense-to take
the additional step and require some corroborative evidence
aside from the confession which would link the accused with
the crime. If, as suggested in Forte v. United States, supra,
and State v. Johnson, supra, the corroboration rule is designed to guard against convictions based on confessions resulting from coercion or mental derangement, this would seem
to be the very point on which corroborative evidence might be
needed most frequently if any such safeguard at all is to be
preserved. This would be true, for example, in those cases
where there is evidence of a criminal offense, circumstantial
or otherwise, and the crime has received wide publicity-at
least if we'can assume that such publicity will tempt the deranged to confess for the sake of notoriety or, perhaps, from
some sense of guilt or from simple confusion. Or, too, if we
can assume that the publicized offense creates pressure 6n the
police to secure confessions by methods that are less than
laudable. Nor does such a rule seem to be an arbitrary or
undue impediment to the process of securing the convictions
of guilty persons.
(b) How much evidence is required to corroboratethe confession? This query concerns the requirement of probative
value or cogency for corroborative evidence. Wigmore has
characterized discussions of this topic or statements of governing rules as "mere useless chaff" 7 Wigmore, Evidence
§ 20 5 9 , p. 334 (3rd ed. 1940) aid "a waste of the state's time"
(id.' at §2062 p. 356). This writer is tempted to refrain from
dissefiting. The Virginia court, in Campbell v. Commonwealth,
194 Va. 825 at 833, 834 (1953) combined two statements in an
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apparent inconsistency, asserting that "it takes only slight
evidence to establish the corpus delicti when the commission of
the crime has been fully confessed by the accused ... As said
by Mr. Justice Eggleston in the Wheeler case: I ... a confession is competent evidence tending to prove the corpus delicti,
and all that is required of the Commonwealth in such cases is
that there be such substantial corroborative circumstances as
will, when taken in connection with the confession, establish
the corpus delicti beyond reasonable doubt.' " (Emphasis added.) Since the second statement is offered as explanatory of
the first, perhaps the substantial evidence requirement is controlling.
(c) Can admissions of the accused serve to corroboratea
confession.? In Pepoon v. Commonwealth, 192 Va. 804 (1951)
the accused made three separate statements in the nature of
admissions or confessions to different parties indicating that
he had committed the act of sodomy per os on the person of a
young boy, and it was held that there was no evidence to corroborate his confession as to the corpus delicti. Since Virginiais committed to the doctrine that the corpus delicti cannot be
established by the uncorroborated extra-judicial confession
of the accused, and, presumably, to the policy underlying the
doctrine, the result seems sound. It is reasonable to assume
the probability that the mistake, coercion, or mental disability
that prompts one confession would often operate to prompt a
series of such confessions. If one confession or admission in
such a series could serve as corroboration of another such confession or admission, the policy behind the corroboration
doctrine is defeated and the rule itself becomes meaningless
in the kind of case under discussion. McCormick disagrees
here. He says: "May admissions of the accused serve to corroborate a confession? If made voluntarily and not as a part
of the confession itself, they would certainly seem to give
persuasive confirmation of the truth of the confession. It is
submitted that they should be regarded, where they tend to
prove the corpus delicti as sufficient." McCormick, Evidence,
§110, Note 7, (1954). In line with Professor McCormick's
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viewpoint, in part at least, it seems possible to draw a line
between a statement qualifying as an admission at the time of
the trial, but made prior to the occurrence of the alleged criminal offense (where the danger of coercion would be non-existent), and in a case in which the nature of the admission fairly
negatived any substantial suspicion that it resulted from mistake or mental impairment, and an admission made after the
occurrence of the offense where all of the dangers underlying
the corroboration requirement would, potentially, be involved.
The corroboration rule might well be relaxed to allow admissions of the kind first suggested to operate as corroborative
evidence. Here, as indicated, the danger of official coercion
disappears and the danger that the admission might be
prompted by the kind of mental derangement that is excited by criminal conduct is also non-existent or substantially
minimized.

